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The Woolwich attack in May 2013 has led to a spate of hate crimes committed 
against Muslim communities in the United Kindom. These incidents include Muslim 
women being targeted for wearing the headscarf and mosques being vandalized. 
While street level Islamophobia remains an important area of investigation, an 
equally disturbing picture is emerging with the rise in online anti-Muslim abuse. This 
article argues that online Islamophobia must be given the same level of attention as 
street level Islamophobia. It examines 500 tweets from 100 different Twitter users to 
examine how Muslims are being viewed and targeted by perpetrators of online 
abuse via the Twitter search engine, and offers a typology of offender 
characteristics. 
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Introduction 
 
In May 2013, Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo murdered British soldier 
Lee Rigby in Woolwich, south-east London. The men ran him over in a car before 
using knives and a meat cleaver to attack and murder him. Adebowale and 
Adebolajo were convicted of the murder of Lee Rigby in December 2013. At the time, 
the incident provoked strong public anger and outrage by politicians, policymakers 
and the media. British Prime Minister David Cameron argued that the Woolwich 
attack would not “divide us” but instead make us “stronger” in the fight against global 
and home-grown terrorism. However, the tragic events of that day also led to a 
series of attacks against Muslims, mosques (BBC News, 2013a), and Islamic 
institutions, amounting to a sharp increase in Islamophobia-related incidents (BBC 
News, 2013b). Indeed, a number of police forces saw a dramatic surge in the 
number of reported hate crimes against Muslims, with the Metropolitan police 
recording 500 Islamophobic crimes, since Woolwich (The Guardian, 2013). While a 
number of these incidents took place offline (i.e., with the use of direct physical force; 
Saul, 2013) there were also people who used social media sites to either vent their 
anger or to make actual death threats against Muslim communities (BBC News, 
2013c). Clearly, major incidents such as the Woolwich attack can provoke public 
outrage, anger, and can lead to stereotyping of all Muslim communities as being 
violent extremists (Larsson, 2007). Indeed, the Internet and social media sites such 
as Twitter have become a popular arena for online hate, partly due to their 
accessibility and the anonymity they offer for offenders who use it to intimidate, 
harass, and bully others (Christopherson, 2007). Following the Woolwich attack, we 
have seen how Twitter was used by offenders who promoted this type of online 
Islamophobic hate, including tactics of harassment and threats of reprisal attacks 
(BBC News, 2013c) (Figure 1). 
 
Online anti-Muslim abuse occurring on social networking sites, such as 
Twitter, can be categorized as being “cyber harassment,” “cyber bullying,” “cyber 
abuse,” “cyber incitement/threats,” and “cyber hate” (Wall, 2001). Many of the 
comments posted online through social networking sites have an extremist and 
incendiary undertone. Moreover, they are not confined to social networking sites and 
include blogging sites, online chat rooms, and other virtual platforms that can be 
used to promote online cyber hate and Islamophobia (Allen, 2014), often in the form 
of racist jokes and stereotypical “banter” (Weaver, 2013). If these incidents go 
unchecked, this type of negativity can also lead to an escalation of online abuse and 
the normalization of such behavior, including physical attacks (Allport, 1954). For 
example, a number of sites such as the http://anti–islam.blogspot.co.uk/ (Anti-Islam 
Blog, 2013) and http://www.jihadwatch.org/ aim to tackle what they call the “anti-
civilization of Islam.” While many of these blogs and websites use the cloak of 
freedom of expression to perpetuate an anti-Muslim rhetoric, it inevitably attracts 
users who are quick to post comments on pieces that have a deeply embedded anti-
Muslim narrative (JihadWatch, 2013). 
 
Clearly, online abuse is not restricted to online Islamophobia, for example, it could be 
online anti-Semitic abuse, racist abuse, homophobic abuse, gender-based abuse 
and antidisability abuse,1 however this article aims to shed light on this 
phenomenon, which following the Woolwich attack had become the prime focus for 
the British police force and other similar agencies that investigate online hate crime. 
Statistics from the police and organizations such as Tell Measuring Anti-Muslim 
Attacks (MAMA) report a significant increase in the number of people reporting 
online anti-Muslim abuse to them (Tell MAMA, 2013). Feldman, Littler, Dack, and 
Copsey (2013, p. 21) found that: “The majority of the incidents of Muslim hate crime 
reported to Tell MAMA are online incidents and 300–69 percent—of these online 
cases reported a link to the far right,” specifically to the English Defence League 
(EDL) and the British National Party (BNP).2 They also found that most of the online 
hate reported to Tell MAMA was committed by males, and that some of the online 
hate incidents also included threats of offline action. Feldman et al. (2013, p. 23) 
state that a number of online incidents reported included direct threats from burning 
down mosques to killing Muslim babies. They state that: “Racist remarks were, in 
turn, mainly anti-Pakistani comments and references to dirt and filth. More generally 
there were comments accusing Muslims of rape; paedophilia; incest; interbreeding; 
being terrorists; and killing Jews” (Feldman et al., 2013, p. 23). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Selection of Tweets Following the Woolwich Attack, Which Can Also Be 
Accessed via http://publicshaming.tumblr.com/search/woolwich. All Tweets Have 
Been Anonymized. 
 
 
These facts are not isolated, as the UK’s Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO), also revealed a similar trend that saw them receive 136 complaints of 
online anti-Muslim abuse, coinciding with the immediate aftermath of the Woolwich 
attack and reported through its “True Vision” website which deals with hate crimes 
following the death of Lee Rigby (ACPO, 2013). True Vision is the UK police’s main 
cyber tool in tackling online hate. It examines illegal content that threatens or 
harasses a person or group of persons because of hostility toward their race, 
religion, sexual orientation, disability, or transgender. It notes, however that: “Most 
hateful or violent website content is not illegal” and gives victims of online hate three 
options in dealing with the incident (True Vision, 2013). These include reporting the 
material to the police, reporting the material to a hosting company, or contacting the 
website administrator to remove the material (True Vision, 2013). 
 
This article examines 500 tweets, from 100 different Twitter users, to try and find out 
how Muslims are viewed by perpetrators of online abuse, who are targeting them 
through social media sites such as Twitter. All of the tweets were analyzed between 
January 2013 and April 2014, and are available and accessible in the open public 
domain. The overwhelming number of tweets were written and posted by people who 
were living in the United Kingdom, although there were some tweets from users who 
were based in Australia and the United States.  From the data collected, the majority 
of tweets (72 percent) were posted by males.  Three hashtags (#Woolwich, #Muslim, 
and #Islam) were used to examine patterns emerging regarding online Islamophobia 
on Twitter, having appeared on the Twitter search engine as words that had recently 
“trended” in the United Kingdom. For example, on September 11, 2013, the hashtag 
#FuckMuslims was trending (Figure 2). Following this, the article provides a typology 
of offender characteristics. To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine online 
Islamophobia via Twitter and provides a typology, therefore making an important 
contribution to help us understand the role of Islamophobia on social media network 
sites, such as Twitter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A Selection of Trending Tweets on September 11, 2013. All Tweets Have 
Been Anonymized. 
 
Online Islamophobia remains under researched. Indeed, a recent report conducted 
by Feldman et al. (2013, p. 10) regarding online anti-Muslim prejudice has 
highlighted how: “The online domain remains under-researched” and “much less 
attention has been paid to online hate crime, which can be the precursor to more 
physically threatening offline incidents” (11). As noted above, the debate about 
Islamophobia is often centered on street-level incidents, including pulling of 
headscarves and attacks against mosques (Allen, 2010). However, increasingly a 
number of cases reported to organizations like Tell MAMA include online anti-Muslim 
abuse directed against Muslim communities, including high profile Muslim figures 
such as Baroness Warsi (the UK Minister of Faith and Communities) and Jemima 
Khan (wife of the Pakistani cricketer turned politician, Imran Khan) both of whom 
were subjected to online threats which were reported to the police by Tell MAMA 
(Sinha, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, a number of high profile Muslim public figures have also expressed 
their frustration at the lack of support available for Muslims suffering online abuse. 
Hasan, the UK political director of The Huffington Post, recalls the impact of online 
anti-Muslim hate comments made against him: 
 
To say that I find the relentlessly hostile coverage of Islam, coupled with the personal 
abuse that I receive online, depressing is an understatement.  There have been 
times—for instance, when I found my wife curled up on our couch, in tears, after 
having discovered some of the more monstrous and threatening comments on my 
New Statesman blog—when I’ve wondered whether it’s all worth it (Hasan, 2012) 
 
These comments are not isolated; other Muslims in the public eye such as Inayat 
Bunglawala, Huma Qureshi, and Nadiya Takolia have all described the online abuse 
they have suffered, including the following: 
 
…the true face of pakiland is the cleansing of Hindu and Sikh minorities since 1948, 
and the ongoing deceptions practiced by Pakistanis, not some fluff piece about an 
honest man. Exception to the rule. There is a lamppost and noose waiting for every 
jihadi that comes back to Britain and their scum enables and sympathizers… 
(Bunglawala, 2012) 
 
Clearly, the above “hate” comments made online can have a negative impact on the 
victims targeted, and can be very upsetting and unsettling for them and their families 
(Bunglawala, 2012). Evidence from Feldman et al. (2013) also suggests that post 
Woolwich, the Internet and social networking sites have been used by far-right 
groups such as the EDL to promote online cyber hate attacks against Muslim 
communities. This type of prejudice follows a “drip drip” effect, which has intensified 
(Feldman et al., 2013), post Woolwich. 
 
 
Another problem when dealing with online abuse seems to be the laissez-faire 
attitude from some of the social media sites such as Twitter who simply ask the 
victim either to block someone or close their account. In response to the criticisms by 
Stan Collymore, complaining of online racist abuse, Twitter stated that: “We cannot 
stop people from saying offensive, hurtful things on the Internet or on Twitter. But we 
take action when content is reported to us that breaks our rules or is illegal” (BBC 
News, 2014). While cyberspace can be a safe environment for some offenders, 
internal and external mechanisms are equally required to support victims of online 
hate (Sayyed & Vakil, 2011). This article argues that online anti-Muslim hate 
therefore requires a multifaceted and international approach from different agencies, 
including the police, social networking sites, and a government-led approach that 
tackles online Islamophobia as a rising phenomenon. 
 
Background and Context 
 
Recent threats made against the former UK Member of Parliament, the 
Respect Leader, Salma Yaqoob, have reinforced the problem of online anti- 
Muslim abuse. After appearing on the television program BBC Question Time in 
2013, Salma Yaqoob tweeted the following comments to her followers: “Apart from 
this threat to cut my throat by #EDL supporter (!) overwhelmed by warm response to 
what I said on #bbcqt.” The person arrested in connection with the comments, Steve 
Littlejohn, had threatened Salma Yaqoob, stating that: “if that salma yaqueb’s there, 
cut her f### throat, rip weyman bennets teeth out with pliers and carve EDL across 
all the Asian scum who try and attack us” 
(Birmingham Mail, 2013). 
 
Clearly, threatening and abusive comments, whether it be by visual images, fake 
profiles, Facebook messages, online YouTube videos and tweets such as the above, 
can have a detrimental effect on the victims who are targeted, and their families 
(Waddington, 2010). What the above case demonstrates is that online behavior can 
be normalized by offenders, which allows a perpetrator to use in many cases 
anonymity, manipulation, and social control to target their victims (Douglas et al., 
2005). However, while this form of cyber hate often remains invisible, sometimes due 
to offenders deleting tweets and also because the perpetrator can hide their identity, 
the threat remains very real for the victims it targets (Hall, 2005). Indeed, trying to 
ascertain all the potential threats and risks posed online poses a major challenge for 
the security services, the police, and the government. Cyber hate within the policing 
context therefore requires due diligence and an investigation that determines 
potential online offenders, offensive tweets, and those they believe can be 
prosecuted according to the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) rules. 
 
Communications via social media sites, like Twitter, can be a criminal offense. The 
CPS guidelines state that there must be either: a credible threat of violence; 
communications which specifically target an individual or group of people; 
communications which amount to a breach of a court order; or communications 
which may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false (CPS, 2014). 
In many of these cases people can be charged for comments made via social 
networking sites under “racially motivated” or “religiously motivated” crimes through 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the 
Communications Act 2003, and the Public Order Act 1986 (Coliandris, 2012). 
Overall, policing Twitter and people’s activity via social media sites remains difficult, 
and the recent Leveson Inquiry (2012) in the United Kingdom, set up by the UK 
government to investigate the culture, practices and ethics of the Press also 
acknowledges that it is problematic to regulate. 
 
Despite this, following Woolwich a number of arrests were made where people had 
posted comments on Twitter and Facebook that were deemed to incite racial hatred 
or violence. In one case, a person was convicted under the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988, after an offensive message was posted on Facebook 
(Urquhart, 2013). Cyber hate regulation therefore requires the police and other 
agencies to act quickly and more effectively in relation to online Islamophobic abuse. 
At the moment, it appears that social media sites such as Twitter resemble a virtual 
minefield of hate, and therefore policing it requires a new process of educating 
people of the dangers of online abuse and providing victims with support (Chan, 
2007). 
 
What Is Cyber Hate and Online Islamophobia? 
 
There is no universal definition of a hate crime; instead we have a myriad of 
interpretations, which include statements or terms aimed at targeting a person or 
person(s) because of their particular religion, gender, race, sexual orientation, 
physical or mental disability, and ethnicity. Cyber hate, therefore, is the nexus of 
those communications and concepts where a perpetrator utilizes electronic 
technology and the convergence of space, movement and behavior in a “safe” virtual 
environment to “control” and target “opponents” considered to be a threat 
(Awan & Blakemore, 2012). This type of control allows the perpetrator to act in a 
dominant way against groups they deem to be subordinate; often in the case of 
Muslims, by attacking their faith and ethnicity (Perry, 2001). 
It also allows offenders to use the online world and other social networking platforms 
to target individuals they deem to be “different” from them both in an ideological, 
political, and religious sense (Taras, 2012). As noted above, cyber hate is a complex 
phenomenon and is used to promote a particular ideology that promotes racial 
hatred, religious intolerance, and also allows “lone wolfs” and “hate groups” to exert 
power and social control in a systematic and targeted manner that has no respect for 
a victim’s rights (Perry, 2001). Academics looking at the psychology of online 
offenders have also argued that such people have an inherent problem around their 
own personal identity, whereby the use of the Internet becomes a safe haven for 
them and creates a sense of anonymity, allowing them to use and exploit social and 
political beliefs as an ideology that has no respect for the individuals or groups it 
targets. This can therefore result in them trying to use online methods as a means of 
self-protectionism and false patriotism, as for groups like the far right, which fuel anti-
Muslim hate and abuse (Cole & Cole, 2009). 
 
This can also often be played out by abusive, threatening, and coordinated tweets or 
through the use of sites like Twitter to send messages of hate, including the use of 
visual images to target particular individuals (Whine, 2003). Clearly, it should be 
noted that the Internet can also be an extremely valuable tool in helping detect and 
tackle online cyber crime, and increasingly is being used by the police to help 
engage with communities. Blakemore (2013), for example, argues that the use of 
social networking sites by the police can have an important impact on people’s level 
of “fear of cyber crime” and also can help assist them report such incidents to the 
police. 
 
The Runnymede Trust (1997) has identified eight components that they define as 
constituting Islamophobia. They include where people view: (i) Islam as a faith that is 
unresponsive to change; (ii) where the values of Islam appear not to be compatible 
with other cultures and faiths; (iii) Islam is viewed as being a religion that is barbaric 
and sexist; (iv) Islam is also seen as being a religion that is both violent and 
aggressive; (v) Islam is viewed as a political ideology; (vi) Islam and criticisms made 
about the faith are unwarranted; (vii) discriminatory practices are used to justify 
exclusion of Muslim communities; and (viii) anti-Muslim crime is seen as normal. 
 
Interestingly, very little discussion is made of online Islamophobia. They argue that 
Islamophobic views is shaped by a “closed set” of narrow views on Islam and 
Muslims, which has helped contribute to the “othering” of Muslim communities 
through discriminative practices and affects (Awan, 2012). The Forum against 
Islamophobia and Racism (2013) argues that Islamophobia constitutes fear and 
hostility against Muslim communities. However, like the above interpretations, they 
confine Islamophobia to physical attacks such as abuse and targeted violence 
against Muslim communities, mosques, cemeteries, and discrimination in places of 
education (Allen, 2001). 
 
While these definitions remain limited in scope with regard to the online dimension of 
Islamophobia, they do however give us a starting point for further discussion and 
discourse in this area. I argue here, however, that we need a separate definition of 
online Islamophobia, which is recognizable both at a policy level and an academic 
level. For example, a definition which includes: “Anti-Muslim hate is prejudice that 
targets a victim in order to provoke, cause hostility and promote intolerance through 
means of harassment, stalking, abuse, incitement, threatening behavior, bullying and 
intimidation of the person or persons, via all platforms of social media” could be used 
as a means to help assist the police. 
Methodology and Findings 
 
This article examines how Muslims are being viewed via one main social media 
platform, namely Twitter. Five hundred tweets are analyzed to look for patterns 
emerging about Muslim communities on this social media platform. The research 
questions in this article include: 
 
_ How is Twitter being used to describe and view Muslims? 
_ What content is being used via Twitter to demonize and stereotype Muslims? 
_ What physical and nonphysical threats are being used against Muslims via 
Twitter? 
 
This article uses a mixed methodology as part of a wider content analysis utilizing 
qualitative and quantitative data gathering techniques embedded within grounded 
theory. The tweets were analyzed between January 2013 and April 2014, using the 
hashtags #Woolwich, #Muslim, and #Islam in order to examine patterns emerging 
regarding online Islamophobia on Twitter. Hashtags allow an opportunity to use 
specific terms such as Muslim and Islam, as a means to see how Muslims were 
depicted both before and post Woolwich (indeed, these terms had appeared on the 
Twitter search engine as words that had recently “trended” in the United Kingdom). 
This enabled the researcher to collect a random sample of 500 tweets from 100 
different Twitter user profiles. As noted previously, the overwhelming number of 
tweets were written and posted by people in the United Kingdom, although there 
were some tweets from users who were based in Australia and the United States. 
The majority of tweets were posted by males (72 percent). There were a number of 
terms that were used to describe Muslims in a negative manner, however some of 
the most common reappearing words used to describe Muslims in a derogatory way 
were also examined (Figure 3); these included the words Muslim pigs (9 percent), 
Muzrats (14 percent), Muslim Paedos (30 percent), Muslim terrorists (22 percent), 
Muslim scum (15 percent), and Pisslam (10 percent). 
 
Tell MAMA, which measures anti-Muslim hate attacks also examined the use of 
words on social media to describe Muslims from January 2013 to December 2013, 
collating high-frequency words that were directly related to anti-Muslim hate and 
prejudice. They also (similarly) found the words Ninja, Muzrats, and Paedo being 
used against Muslims (Tell MAMA, 2014). After examining the 500 tweets, and 
looking at the use of language to depict Muslims in a negative light, a typology was 
constructed, consisting of eight different people identified as cyber trolls; that is, 
people who are using social networking sites such as Twitter to produce a sustained 
campaign of hate against Muslim communities. Examples of these tweets are shown 
in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Word Cloud of Most Frequent Posts of Anti-Muslim Prejudice From Twitter. 
Awan: Islamophobia and Twitter 141 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A Selection of Tweets Examined in the Article. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Typology of Online Perpetrators 
 
Over 75 percent of the tweets examined showed a strong Islamophobic feeling, used 
to stereotype and blame all Muslims on a particular issue, used to justify the abuse. 
For example, some accounts were open about their anger and hatred for Muslims as 
a result of recent cases surrounding Asian men convicted of grooming underage 
girls. Moreover, a number of accounts also used and disseminated anti-Muslim 
images and literature as a means to defame and caricature Muslims as dangerous 
pedophiles. Indeed, the word Muslim Paedos was used up to 30 percent of times, 
reflecting and coinciding with recent cases of Muslim men convicted of grooming 
offenses (Greenwood, 2013). However, in some cases people simply used Twitter as 
a means to antagonize and create hostility with some accounts using derogatory 
terminology by referring to Muslims as Muzrats (a demeaning word to describe 
Muslims as vermin or comparing them to a disease). Some tweets used a number of 
hostile hashtags to note how #Islamkills and whites would become a minority unless 
the Muzrats are stopped. Interestingly, the word #Muslimterrorists also appeared 
high on the list of frequent words used, accounting for 22 percent. In particular, it 
became part of the September 11 trending words across Twitter where Muslims 
were being depicted through pictures and videos as extremists and terrorists. 
 
On the face of it, a number of offenders shared similar characteristics but were 
different in their approaches to targeting Muslim communities online. Using an online 
content behavioral offender typology, the tweets were grouped into different 
categories, to create the following typologies. These are: the trawler (a person who 
has gone through other people’s Twitter accounts to specifically target people with a 
Muslim connection); the apprentice (someone who is fairly new to Twitter but 
nonetheless has began to target people with the help of more experienced online 
abusers); the disseminator (someone who has tweeted about and retweeted 
messages, pictures, and documents of online hate that are specifically targeting 
Muslims); the impersonator (a person who is using a fake profile, account, and 
images to target individuals); the accessory (a person who is joining in with other 
people’s conversations via Twitter to target vulnerable people); the reactive (a 
person who following a major incident, such as Woolwich, or issues on immigration, 
will begin an online campaign targeting that specific group and individual); the mover 
(someone who regularly changes their Twitter account in order to continue targeting 
someone from a different profile); and finally, the professional (a person who has a 
huge following on Twitter and regardless of consequences has and will launch a 
major campaign of hate against an individual or group of people because they are 
Muslim. This person will also likely to have multiple Twitter accounts all aimed at 
targeting Muslim communities) (Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the heart of each of these different categories, it became clear that the users 
involved had similar motivations. Some of those were based on seeking authority 
and power as shown by some tweets from users who used their Twitter account to 
collect and maximize influence. In such a case, this affords some people the 
motivation to commit the online abuse and as a result, they are able to target specific 
people (Iganski, 2012). Figure 5 shows a cycle demonstrating those key 
characteristics of the cybertroll. 
 
Challenges Around Online Hate and Islamophobia 
 
As noted previously, online Islamophobia is under researched both at a policy level 
and an academic level. This article argues that a new cyber hate policy is much 
needed both at a government level and a policing level, which would be timely 
considering the recent spike of online anti-Muslim abuse, leading to ACPO receiving 
over 136 separate incidents following Woolwich (ACPO, 2013). Cyber hate has been 
used by the far-right and White supremacists, who have used it to inflame religious 
and racial tensions; a study for the British-based think-tank group Demos (2011) 
found that far-right populist movements are gaining in support across Europe and 
playing upon a small perception of public disenfranchisement within society to 
promote an agenda of protecting national identity as a method to whip up online anti- 
Muslim hate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Cyber Troll: A Cycle of Online Abuse. 
 
The Demos study (2011) is interesting because their findings would seem to suggest 
that the EDL have become a web-based far-right group that is using social 
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter where it has gained a core group of 
online sympathizers to target Muslim communities (Awan & Blakemore, 2012). The 
Demos study found that on a national scale, 72 percent of supporters for the EDL 
were under the age of 30, and 36 percent of people were aged between 16 and 20; 
thus reflecting the movement’s desire to attract a “younger” audience on social 
networking sites such as Facebook. 
 
The Online Hate Prevention Centre report (2013) into online Islamophobia searched 
over 50 different Facebook pages and showed a clear correlation of hate speeches 
online that were targeted toward Muslims. Overall, they found 349 separate 
instances of online hate speeches directed against Muslims, including a number of 
Facebook pages created in order to specifically target Muslim communities. For 
example, the “Boycott all Halal products in Australia!” page, which has over 520 likes 
(https://www.facebook.com/pages/boycott-all-halalproducts-in 
australia/171203192936626), the page “The truth about Islam” which has over 
150,000 likes (https://www.facebook.com/TheIslamicThreat), the Islam is Evil page 
(418 likes) (https://www.facebook.com/IslamIsEvil), and the Prophet Muhammad Still 
Burns in Hell page which has 470 likes (https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-
Prophet-Muhammad-STILL-Burns-In-Hell-Fire/281538198643648). 
 
As noted above, policing cyberspace is difficult. Indeed, Feldman et al. (2013) found 
that 74 percent of reported anti-Muslim prejudice occurred online, in comparison to 
26 percent of offline incidents. Worryingly, critics argue that the difficult nature of 
policing cyberspace has therefore led to Muslim communities being failed by their 
local police forces in the United Kingdom. Indeed, Tell MAMA, which records anti-
Muslim attacks, showed that it had recorded 1,432 cases of online abuse in the last 
22 months and argued that not enough was being done to investigate it (BBC News, 
2013d). 
 
The problem for the police therefore is helping root out far-right groups and lone wolf 
extremists who are using social networking sites like Twitter to post malicious 
statements (Esposito & Kalin, 2011). This realm of cyber activism used by groups 
like the EDL and others who are promoting online hate means the police require 
more people to report what they see and what they read so that they can take the 
necessary actions required to either remove the online hate material or in some 
cases arrest and charge people. At the moment those who use online hate to 
disguise themselves in a cloak of anonymity remain at large because they 
understand that unless someone reports them they can remain anonymous. 
 
 
Reporting Online Islamophobia 
 
One of the major issues of online anti-Muslim abuse is the role of the police in 
dealing with an increasingly complex arena that allows many people to remain 
anonymous. Tell MAMA (2013), for example, actively encourages people to report 
these incidents. Apart from these problems, the role of the police in dealing with hate 
incidents offline will also have an impact on how incidents are reported online. For 
example, public perception of the police in tackling offline hate crime has had a 
significant impact upon police and Muslim community relations (BBC News, 2013d). 
 
Historically, the policing of ethnic minorities has often been tainted by allegations of 
policing by stereotypes that includes racial prejudice and racial discrimination of 
black and Asian men (Bowling, 1999). Following the 9/11 attacks the risk is that 
those stereotypes have re-emerged with “over policing” of Muslim communities, who 
are increasingly viewed with suspicion (Awan, 2012).  This has intensified with cases 
such as Rizwaan Sabir. Sabir, a student at the University of Nottingham, was 
arrested by the police for downloading an al-Qaeda training manual but released 
without charge. After winning damages of £20,000 from Nottinghamshire police, for 
false imprisonment, Sabir said: “I was very, very lucky in the sense that I was 
released without charge because I was innocent in the first place…” (Jones, 2011). 
 
The Sabir case highlights how, post-9/11, the police need to be very careful about 
how they deal with counterterrorism cases, because old stereotypes may reemerge 
and may have an impact upon how Muslim communities report online abuse. A study 
by Awan, Blakemore, and Simpson (2013) regarding policing and Muslim community 
relations found that participants would often describe the police as either being 
“racist,” “heavy-handed,” “unprofessional,” and having a “lack of communication and 
community skills.” This in turn resulted in the Muslim community not reporting crime 
to the police because they felt a sense of mistrust. 
 
Indeed, core issues such as a lack of trust in the police service were also discussed 
by participants in the Awan et al. (2013) study, suggesting that individual 
experiences with the police may be a reason why the community lost trust in the 
police, and why some communities may not feel comfortable in reporting online 
abuse to the police. Counterterrorism policing operations also appeared to have a 
significant impact on the Muslim community’s perception of the police service. For 
example, in Birmingham, the local community and area had been making headline 
news in the wake of controversial counterterrorism arrests. Project Champion and 
the installation of secret CCTV cameras to effectively ring-fence the Muslim 
community in predominately Muslim areas in Birmingham and monitor their 
movements was an additional reason why the community were distrustful of the 
police (Awan, 2012). 
 
The problem regarding the low level of people reporting online abuse may also be 
due to people not being aware when an online offense has been committed. 
Furthermore, even if such cases are reported to the police, it is acknowledged that 
they have limited resources, and in many cases tracking the crime can present many 
problems from both a jurisdictional point of view with Internet Service Providers, to 
the role of free speech and the issue of online anonymity. Thus, for the police it can 
be like “finding a needle in a virtual haystack” (Awan & Blakemore, 2012, p. 11). The 
police therefore must look to adopt different policing models, ranging from 
community-led policing to intelligence-led policing, in helping tackle the problem. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cyber hate remains a complex problem and with the emerging rise of online anti-
Muslim hate, prejudice, discrimination, and threats there is an urgent need to 
examine this area in more depth. This article has provided a brief snapshot of the 
problem of online anti-Muslim abuse by examining online Islamophobia on 
Twitter, and suggesting that positive ways of dealing with such problems will require 
a multifaceted partnership approach. As a result, a new international and national 
online cyber hate strategy should be adopted, that highlights online anti-Muslim 
abuse and ways in which the police can deal with such incidents. 
 
Perhaps a further strengthening of cyber hate regulation and protocols could also be 
used to tackle online threats made against people of all backgrounds, including anti-
Muslim abuse, and at the same time ensuring free speech is protected. Accordingly, 
the UK government and police service must examine all online threats and the links 
with actual offline violence as this could help agencies have a better understanding 
of what they are dealing with. The reporting of online anti-Muslim abuse must also be 
taken seriously; improved relations between the police and Muslim community may 
help to achieve that. A more robust and clearer definition of what is online 
Islamophobia should also be adopted. 
 
The tweets examined in this article highlight the derogatory and systematic abuse 
that people are suffering as a result of online abuse. The typology created of online 
abusers shows that offenders presented some key characteristics and motivations 
behind their actions. We need to begin a process of evidence-based research to help 
create a safer online space for users; including innovative ways that policymakers, 
police forces, third sector organizations, and social networking sites (such as Twitter 
and Facebook) can best respond to online anti-Muslim hate crime. This should 
hopefully result in an improved dialogue between the different stakeholders and 
ensure that online anti-Muslim hate incidents are taken more seriously. In particular, 
Twitter has been criticized for a lack of real action toward online hate; hopefully this 
study can shed light on some important changes they and the police can make to 
ensure online hate crime can be dealt with in a more efficient and proactive manner. 
 
 
Notes 
1. See the cases of Stan Collymore (BBC News, 2014) and Caroline Criado-Perez 
(The Huffington Post, 
2013). 
 
2. The EDL is a UK-based far-right organization that has at its core the aim to tackle 
“militant Islam,” and the BNP is a far-right UK political party. 
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